Article III DCUS / USDC,. Re: Missing pages of critically important materials
From: Paul Andrew Mitchell <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2012 3:41 PM
Subject: Re: Missing pages of critically important materials
> If this evidence doesn’t make the point that something is SERIOUSLY and INTENTIONALLY afoot in the halls of Washington, I don’t know what does.
We tried to broach the subject from an historical perspective here:
The historical record therefore proves that Congress never expressed any intent to abolish the DCUS, nor is there any evidence in that record that Congress intended to make the USDC a “District Court of the United States”. Appellant is forced to speculate that FDR returned from the Yalta Conference with a secret deal which he shared with Truman, namely: to end WWII, foreign banks agreed to finance the United States, provided that its government agreed to lien on the assets of all American People, in order to repay those massive loans. When FDR died, Truman inherited that “deal” and thus was launched the Bill which later broadcasted the USDC into every State of the Union.
There was already ample historical precedent for this very thing ...
The exact same thing almost happened to President Lincoln near the
end of the Civil War: Wall Street Bankers wanted to charge him
these exorbitant interest rates e.g. 27%, and Lincoln said, "No!"
So, as of the 19th Century, we know that world bankers were
already using wars to take control of the debt caused by those wars.
Witness this brave dialogue in the film "The International"
starring Clive Owen and Naomi Watts:
"No. No. The IBBC is a bank.
"Their objective isn't to control the conflict;
it's to control the debt the conflict produces."
-- from "The International" starring Clive Owen and Naomi Watts
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4KvzuDbG-TQ <--- fabulous dialogue here!!
Of course, that was just a legal theory or hypothesis, when we
broached the subject at the Sixth Circuit here:
Nevertheless, it makes sense that evil-minded personnel, employed
by the Federal Judiciary during World War II, could have easily
seized upon the massive distractions it caused -- by conjuring up
a "sea change" from constitutional courts to legislative tribunals.
I really do think that this scam was so well hidden, that most of
the Federal lawmakers were not really aware of that hidden agenda.
I say "most of the Federal lawmakers" because the Bill in question
was sent back to the House by the Senate in 1947, to work out
the Senate's objections to the lack of clarity about the
legislative intent for either the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts or
the Claims Court (I can't remember which, without checking).
In other words, as I recall from reading the legislative history,
certain Senators hotly debated whether the reorganized
bankruptcy courts would be constitutional courts or
That was a VERY BIG CLUE, in point of fact.
Then, when Truman finally did get around to signing the revised Bill,
on June 25, 1948 (4 DAYS after I was born), he immediately called
a Special Session of Congress -- during an Election Year.
One-third of the Senate were furious, and all Representatives were
also furious, because they wanted to be home campaigning
for the Fall election cycle.
So, the Congress retaliated by voting against almost all of
the special legislation that Truman tried to introduce during
that Special Session.
Nevertheless, the real damage had already been done --
by the 2 Titles which were revised, codified and enacted into positive law
back-to-back: the last page of the Title 18 revision is followed
immediately by the first page of the Title 28 revision!
I knew I was on the right track when I discovered the
standing decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Willy v. Coastal Corp.: Rules of Court may not expand
or restrict original jurisdiction conferred by Act of Congress!!
THAT ONE DECISION CAUSES THE ENTIRE HOUSE OF CARDS
TO COLLAPSE UPON ITSELF!!
Answer: because the grants of original jurisdiction
to the DCUS could ONLY have been changed by
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure --
using the Abrogation Clause at 28 U.S.C. 2072 as their
specious "authority" for doing so!
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
CONGRESS HAD NOT LEGISLATED SUCH CHANGES,
NOR HAD THE PRESIDENT APPROVED THOSE CHANGES
BY SIGNING ANY SUCH ACTS OF CONGRESS!!
The changes to those statutes were attempted by
means of amendments to the FRCP and FRCrP,
but the Supreme Court has held -- correctly --
that Rules of Court may NOT DO SO!!!
The critical path to the SMOKING GUN then became the
Schedule of Laws Repealed in the Act of June 25, 1948.
By invoking the Lanham Act in my copyright case,
I was able to PROVE that the grant of original jurisdiction
at 15 U.S.C. 1121 had neither been amended to
change the court named, nor repealed and re-enacted
so as to change the court named from DCUS to USDC:
NOTE WELL how that statute reads EVEN TODAY:
(a) The district and territorial courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction and the courts of appeal of the United States (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have appellate jurisdiction, of all actions arising under this chapter, without regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship of the parties.
Thus, as we pointed out, the phrase
"district and territorial courts of the United States"
can be correctly de-constructed to refer to:
"district courts of the United States" (in the State Zone)
"territorial courts of the United States" (in the federal zone)
THAT STATUTE DOES NOT SHOW UP
IN THE SCHEDULE OF LAWS REPEALED:
therefore, the Federal district court with original jurisdiction
was and, STILL IS, the Article III DCUS!!
That method turned out to be so robust, it can be easily applied
in the same manner to all prior Acts of Congress which were
NOT itemized anywhere in that Schedule of Laws Repealed!!!
For example, the 1866 Civil Rights Act is one such Act of Congress
which conferred original jurisdiction upon the Article III DCUS
(it HAD TO DO SO, because the USDCs did not even exist
inside the several States until June 25, 1948):
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the district courts of the United States, within their respective districts, shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences committed against the provisions of this act, and also, concurrently with the circuit courts of the United States, of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights secured to them by the first section of this act; ....
There are many other examples, like the above e.g. Sherman Antitrust Act,
Securities and Exchange Act, and so on -- NONE OF WHICH WERE
ITEMIZED ANYWHERE IN THE SCHEDULE OF LAWS REPEALED.
For further reading, see the Press Release that we filed and served
in my copyright infringement case;
p.s. Aside from IRS-related messages, I would guess
that there are more messages in the SupremeLaw archives
on these key points than any other topics discussed in those archives.
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General, 18 U.S.C. 1964
http://www.supremelaw.org/index.htm (Home Page)
http://www.supremelaw.org/support.policy.htm (Support Policy)
http://www.supremelaw.org/guidelines.htm (Client Guidelines)
http://www.supremelaw.org/support.guidelines.htm (Policy + Guidelines)
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
On Tue, Jul 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, Greg Melick <email@example.com> wrote:
Thanks for the serious heads up! It would be far too easy to pass something like this over, simply because it might be difficult to discover that the LAST PART of an Act wasn’t included in an otherwise apparently authentic copy of the original publication.
If this evidence doesn’t make the point that something is SERIOUSLY and INTENTIONALLY afoot in the halls of Washington, I don’t know what does.
On 7/10/12 3:16 PM, "Paul Andrew Mitchell" <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
"Jon Roland's" archive omits 19 entire pages
from Volume 62 of the Statutes at Large:
[62 Stat. 992 thru 1009 are missing from Roland's archive]
If you need some explanatory background on the many problems
that arise from the above, see:
... then here for the same problem in Title 18 (Federal criminal code):
Here's the second Abrogation Clause in Title 18:
... but the latter was subsequently replaced with a different statute
dealing with crime victims' rights:
(a) Rights of Crime Victims.— A crime victim has the following rights:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding.
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.
(b) Rights Afforded.—
(1) In general.— In any court proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in subsection (a). Before making a determination described in subsection (a)(3), the court shall make every effort to permit the fullest attendance possible by the victim and shall consider reasonable alternatives to the exclusion of the victim from the criminal proceeding. The reasons for any decision denying relief under this chapter shall be clearly stated on the record.
(2) Habeas corpus proceedings.—
(A) In general.— In a Federal habeas corpus proceeding arising out of a State conviction, the court shall ensure that a crime victim is afforded the rights described in paragraphs (3), (4), (7), and (8) of subsection (a).
(i) In general.— These rights may be enforced by the crime victim or the crime victim’s lawful representative in the manner described in paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (d).
(ii) Multiple victims.— In a case involving multiple victims, subsection (d)(2) shall also apply.
(C) Limitation.— This paragraph relates to the duties of a court in relation to the rights of a crime victim in Federal habeas corpus proceedings arising out of a State conviction, and does not give rise to any obligation or requirement applicable to personnel of any agency of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.
(D) Definition.— For purposes of this paragraph, the term “crime victim” means the person against whom the State offense is committed or, if that person is killed or incapacitated, that person’s family member or other lawful representative.
(c) Best Efforts To Accord Rights.—
(1) Government.— Officers and employees of the Department of Justice and other departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).
(2) Advice of attorney.— The prosecutor shall advise the crime victim that the crime victim can seek the advice of an attorney with respect to the rights described in subsection (a).
(3) Notice.— Notice of release otherwise required pursuant to this chapter shall not be given if such notice may endanger the safety of any person.
(d) Enforcement and Limitations.—
(1) Rights.— The crime victim or the crime victim’s lawful representative, and the attorney for the Government may assert the rights described in subsection (a). A person accused of the crime may not obtain any form of relief under this chapter.
(2) Multiple crime victims.— In a case where the court finds that the number of crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all of the crime victims the rights described in subsection (a), the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings.
(3) Motion for relief and writ of mandamus.— The rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred. The district court shall take up and decide any motion asserting a victim’s right forthwith. If the district court denies the relief sought, the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals may issue the writ on the order of a single judge pursuant to circuit rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court of appeals shall take up and decide such application forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has been filed. In no event shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five days for purposes of enforcing this chapter. If the court of appeals denies the relief sought, the reasons for the denial shall be clearly stated on the record in a written opinion.
(4) Error.— In any appeal in a criminal case, the Government may assert as error the district court’s denial of any crime victim’s right in the proceeding to which the appeal relates.
(5) Limitation on relief.— In no case shall a failure to afford a right under this chapter provide grounds for a new trial. A victim may make a motion to re-open a plea or sentence only if—
(A) the victim has asserted the right to be heard before or during the proceeding at issue and such right was denied;
(B) the victim petitions the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus within 14 days; and
(C) in the case of a plea, the accused has not pled to the highest offense charged.
This paragraph does not affect the victim’s right to restitution as provided in title 18, United States Code.
(6) No cause of action.— Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize a cause of action for damages or to create, to enlarge, or to imply any duty or obligation to any victim or other person for the breach of which the United States or any of its officers or employees could be held liable in damages. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.
(e) Definitions.— For the purposes of this chapter, the term “crime victim” means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia. In the case of a crime victim who is under 18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardians of the crime victim or the representatives of the crime victim’s estate, family members, or any other persons appointed as suitable by the court, may assume the crime victim’s rights under this chapter, but in no event shall the defendant be named as such guardian or representative.
(f) Procedures To Promote Compliance.—
(1) Regulations.— Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this chapter, the Attorney General of the United States shall promulgate regulations to enforce the rights of crime victims and to ensure compliance by responsible officials with the obligations described in law respecting crime victims.
(2) Contents.— The regulations promulgated under paragraph (1) shall—
(A) designate an administrative authority within the Department of Justice to receive and investigate complaints relating to the provision or violation of the rights of a crime victim;
(B) require a course of training for employees and offices of the Department of Justice that fail to comply with provisions of Federal law pertaining to the treatment of crime victims, and otherwise assist such employees and offices in responding more effectively to the needs of crime victims;
(C) contain disciplinary sanctions, including suspension or termination from employment, for employees of the Department of Justice who willfully or wantonly fail to comply with provisions of Federal law pertaining to the treatment of crime victims; and
(D) provide that the Attorney General, or the designee of the Attorney General, shall be the final arbiter of the complaint, and that there shall be no judicial review of the final decision of the Attorney General by a complainant.
All Rights Reserved. Non Assumpsit. 28 USC 1746(1)
Would you like to make a nice residual income? Get started today, join my team! Team up with Alex Jones' Infowars - Youngevity Business Team for ultimate health, wealth. A healthy body is a happy body!
Very informative video: