Teknosis

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION | RECORD NUMBER 145-10001-10272

26 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting on Cuba, 26 February

PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric and General Lemnitzer; Mr. McCone. General Lansdale and Mr. Harvey were also present.

 

The following decisions were reached:

1. The immediate tasks to be accomplished include:

a. The drafting of a paper for higher authority which will include two assumptions. These are (1) the United States will make maximum use of Cuban resources, but recognizes that final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention; and (2) that development of Cuban resources will be for the purpose of facilitating and supporting this intervention and to provide a preparation and a justification for it. Higher authority will not be asked by this paper to make a poilcy decision at this time, but simply to note the assumptions.

b. The plan presented by General Lansdale will be recast to put into one paper the short-range actions for the months of March, April and May, such as the acquisition of hard intelligence, and other actions drawn from answers to his study of 20 February 1962, which would have a low visibility and little likelihood of giving away the basic plan. Another paper will include those actions which would have the effect of committing the U.S. to greater or lesser degree to intervention. To the extent possible, the actions contemplated in functional annexes to the plan will be assigned to specific time phases. These papers will be circulated before the coming weekend.

The plan will contain more on intelligence, including a reference to the effort required in third countries.

The reference to a Presidential memorandum, in the first two lines of the Lansdale paper of 20 February, will be deleted.

The paper should include reference to the development of adequate Cuban leadership.

c. The Special Group will consider these papers, with the Attorney General present, before presentation to higher authority.

2. The cover plan for early actions will be that the U.S. in pursuing an anti-Castro policy is under the necessity of acquiring as much hard intelligence on Cuba as possible in a short time.

3. Each proposed sabotage operation will be decided on the basis of its individual merits, at the time.

4. Mr. McNamara undertook to provide the boats needed by CIA on presentation of a list of requirements, if they are available within the Defense establishment.

5. Arrangements will be made to have available a facility for radio broadcasts from a submarine, but the decision as to the actual beginning of broadcasting will be deferred until a later date. An internal land-based radio facility will not be considered at this time.

6. General Lansdale is to prepare a list of the individuals who know about this plan, with an estimate of their degree of knowledgeability. A control list will be kept of those having knowledge of the basic document.

7. General Taylor undertook to prepare the paper referred to in paragraph 1a above, which would set forth the guidelines for the further development of the project and would outline the channels of responsibility.

 

 

Thomas A. Parrott

 

No distribution

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION | RECORD NUMBER 145-10001-10273

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

30 October 1962

SENSITIVE
FOR THE RECORD

By Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Operation Mongoose

John McCone asked me to call him on the gray telephone this morning. I did so. He stated that he didn't know exactly how I was supposed to get word on this, so he was informing me to help out: at the Executive Council meeting this morning, the President had decided to hold back Operation Mongoose for the time being. Also, during the negotiations re Soviet missle bases in Cuba, there were to be no Mongoose sabotage or similar militant operations. McCone said that he had informed General Carter of this, but was letting me know, as Chief of Operations, to let the operations team know; he mentioned that Alpha 66 and the approved sabotage of Cuban shipping were to be held, specifically.

I commented that I had just received a copy of a memorandum from him to the Attorney General, the Sec/Def., etc., dated today, saying that CIA was still awaiting word from me on sending in 20 teams by submarine for intelligence collection, after I'd determined JCS and State requirements. I said that I had been told by McGeorge Bundy on Sunday, 28 October, to hold up action on this for 24 hours and had promptly notified CIA, and that yesterday, upon receipt of a memorandum from Bruce Cheever on this same subject, I had taken it up again with Bundy -- and Bundy had told me that he would tell McCone to have CIA hold everything. I presumed that Bundy had so informed McCone. Also, Harvey had called me Sunday night, asking my persmission to discuss CIA assets with CINCLANT and JUWTF for contigency planning; I had given Harvey permission to assist in this planning, if he felt that the U.S. military needed more planning help from the CIA.

After the talk with McCone, I talked with Bruce Cheever who assured me that he had similar orders from Carter and that all militant actions under CIA were being held at a stop. I gave similar orders to General Johnson for Defense/JCS. Lt-Col Patchell concurrently informed State and USIA along the same lines.

SENSITIVE
SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY